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Introduction
In this paper we explore the hypothesis that …rms exploit information asymmetry and adjust their …nancing activities before information about a change in their credit rating is publicly revealed. We show that …rms facing downgrades exploit their presently higher ratings by increasing their debt ratio.
Our research highlights the importance of credit ratings for …rms'…nancial policies.
A change in the issuer's credit rating re ‡ects a substantial change in the long-term credit worthiness of the …rm, and therefore is an important event.
This change assigns a di¤erent quantitative category, which may derive discrete costs and bene…ts of moving to a di¤erent rating level (Kisgen 2006 (Kisgen , 2009 . It can result in adjustments in security prices (Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich 1992; Kliger and Sarig 2000) or a¤ect the …rm's access to the external debt market (Kisgen 2006). Our study is motivated by evidence that rating agencies do not change ratings in a timely manner to re ‡ect the up-to-date …nancial condition of a …rm. The Association for Financial Professionals (AFP) conducted a survey in 2002 and reported that 'most respondents do not believe changes in their company's …nances are promptly re ‡ected in the ratings', with the delay often believed to be around six months. 1 1 Empirical studies have o¤ered some explanations for the observed delay in rating changes. Altman and Rijken (2004) and Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits (2006) , among others, report that rating agencies may grant issuers time to recover before taking rating actions, and that rating agencies who pursue rating accuracy and stability to maintain 1 In this paper, we argue that the di¤erence between the moment when the updated information about the …rm's creditworthiness emerges internally and the moment when a rating agency announces a change in credit rating creates a window of increased information asymmetry between the …rm and investors. This is because managers have …rst-hand information about the …rm's …nancial circumstances, operating performance, growth opportunities and future prospects, while investors may not have easy access to such upto-date information. Moreover, rating agencies typically hold meetings with the …rm to gather information for analysis and then notify the …rm on the rating opinions preceding the publication and dissemination of the outcome. Our ratings data come from Standard and Poor's and thus we use the …gure (Figure 1 ), from Standard and Poor's to illustrate the information transmission mechanism in their process. 3 As shown in Figure 1 , their process suggests that the rating agency and the …rm share common information sets (in particular during stages 5 and 6). However, the …rm might not be able to have direct communications with the rating agency about the exact timing for the release of the rating change information because the timing of the release of information is up to the judgement of the rating agency.
[Insert Figure 1 here] their professional reputations do not revise credit ratings if the expected impact on credit quality of an event is considered as being temporary, uncertain or reversible. 2 For details and a diagram on the rating process, see: http://www.standardandpoors.com/ aboutcreditratings/ RatingsManual_PrintGuide.html. 3 https://www.spratings.com/about/about-credit-ratings/ratings-process.html 2 Consequently, …rm managers are able to foresee rating changes for the …rm in the near future with greater precision than investors, based on their better knowledge of the …rm's …nancial condition, their understandings about the agency's rating criteria and their communications with the rating agency. We term this asymmetry in information about future ratings as the information gap. As such, periods before rating changes increase the "information gap"
between managers and investors. Intuitively, a …rm may require additional …nancing in order to sustain operations when facing deteriorating …nancial conditions It is plausible that the …rm raises more debt at the time of becoming more likely to be downgraded. We model and test whether …rms exploit this information gap by increasing debt just before a downgrade. We argue that …rms have incentives to take actions in order to take advantage of the overvalued debt when ratings are about to be downgraded.
We forecast the probability of a downgrade a quarter ahead using a logit model that incorporates the present realizations of …rm characteristics and …rm actions like increasing debt and/or equity, for a large sample of U.S.
industrial …rms from 1985 to 2010. The rating forecast model incorporates the quarter-end stock price, which re ‡ects investors'information of the …rm available to the market by the time of …rm capital structure activities. In utilizing such price information, we allow the ‡exibility that investors are able to gather signals about the …nancial health of the …rm. This alleviates the possibility of a downgrade due to increased debt of a …rm a quarter earlier 4 . It is not surprising that an increase in debt increases the probability of long-term rating downgrade. Most importantly, we seek to understand whether the …rm possesses superior information not available to the public about a future downgrade in the …rm's long-term credit rating. To this end,
we use the residual of the logit model as the information gap to capture the superior information of the …rm managers.
We then model the relation between the …rm's …nancing adjustments and the estimated information gap about a rating downgrade, controlling for a set of conventional …rm characteristics. This research design estimates the information gap model and the …nancing adjustment model together as a simultaneous system. This further mitigates the potential problem of simultaneity bias in the …nancing change model that can be interpreted as the possibility that the future downgrade is due to additional borrowing.
The use of quarterly data further reduces potential misinterpretation that part of our …ndings might be due to a credit rating agency rapidly responding to capital structure adjustments. The typical delay in credit rating adjustments of around six months reduces the probability that this change occurs in the same or in the subsequent quarter of the capital structure change. In addition, when changes in capital structure drive credit rating adjustments, we would expect similar e¤ects of debt issues and stock repurchases.
Our main …nding is that the information gap signi…cantly a¤ects …rms' …nancing activities, particularly for speculative graded …rms, at least one quarter before the rating change taking place, and also in the same quarter of the rating change. Firms that anticipate downgrades signi…cantly increase debt …nancing by 1.29%, but do not adjust their equity …nancing. In contrast, we …nd that …rms do not take signi…cant …nancing actions one quarter before and in the same quarter of credit rating upgrades.
In our sample, downgraded …rms have lower liquidity than those nondowngraded …rms, on average, highlighting the …nancial constraints of those downgraded …rms, which restrict their ability to deleverage before a downgrade. In other words, …rms that anticipate downgrades tend not to enjoy a luxury choice of trying to cut debt to improve credit quality. Instead, they raise more debt at the present time when debt is still relatively cheap compared to the debt costs once a downgrade is realized. This suggests a channel through which debt overvaluation occurs, which is not derived from the information content already being released to the market but is due to the late release of credit rating information.
The absence of equity changes, as shown in our Tables 1 and 4 , is because net equity issues are small for downgraded …rms (while much larger for nondowngraded …rms). As a result, …rms on average increase their debt ratio by 1.27% when they anticipate long-term credit rating downgrades in the next quarter.
We relate to studies on credit ratings and capital structure. For example, Maung and Chowdhury (2014) examine …rm leverage in the year of and after a credit rating change. Most notably, Kisgen (2006) …nds that …rms adjust their leverage to avoid credit rating downgrades. Issuing debt when it is not yet publicly known that the …rm's credit rating will deteriorate is likely to exploit ine¢ ciencies in the market and maximizes current shareholders'
value. We focus on the …rms that are actually downgraded, and examine …rms'actions before the information about this downgrade is released.
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Overall, our …ndings suggest that …rms make …nancing adjustments when they have information about an upcoming credit rating downgrade that investors might not have. The important implication from our study for regulators is that requiring prompt credit rating updates will reduce the information advantage of managers and could bene…t new debt holders.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops our framework of the information gap and our hypothesis. Section 3 presents the data and sample. Sections 4 and 5 present the methodology and report the results.
Finally, Section 6 concludes.
A model of an information gap
Credit ratings are very important in …nancial markets. This is not only because of the fact that ratings e¤ectively provide an entry ticket for …rms to enter into the debt market, but also that rating changes often lead to adjustments in security prices (Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich 1992) , the …nancing costs of …rms as well as the existing credit and debt agreements of the …rm. Lö-er (2013) claims that "agency ratings exhibit important characteristics one would expect from ratings that see through the cycle".
Kliger and Sarig (2000) show that …rms'debt value increases (decreases) and equity value falls (rises) when realized ratings are better (worse) than expected ratings. In addition, policy makers have drafted …nancial regulations such as Sarbanes-Oxley Act with references to credit ratings, giving rise to an endorsement value of ratings. Any information pointing toward a future change in the credit rating of a …rm is therefore crucial for the stakeholders of the …rm and may in ‡uence the …rm's …nancing decisions. Graham and Harvey (2001) , for example, report that 57.1% of CFOs see credit ratings as important when they determine their …rms'capital structure.
There is evidence that …rms share and exchange information with rating agencies. Kliger and Sarig (2000) argue that instead of revealing information to the public, which may bene…t competitors, …rms provide rating agencies with detailed insider information during the rating process. Kisgen (2006) states that 'rating agencies may receive signi…cant company information that is not public'. Similarly, rating agencies provide feedback to …rms, as is shown in Figure 1 . Thus, we postulate that …rms'private communications to rating agencies may allow them to better anticipate the likelihood of future rating changes relative to the public. In our setup, a change in ratings, released as public news by ratings agencies, occurs in quarter t + 1.
The model
In our framework there are two types of …rms with regard to rating changes in the next quarter: (i) 'bad'…rms who anticipate their ratings to be downgraded, and (ii) 'others'who anticipate their ratings either to be upgraded or to remain unchanged. We use the 'others'category as a baseline in our test. Both types of …rms, 'bad'and 'others', face possible delays in information arrival about a change in ratings. We specify a model in which a rating agency will announce at time t + 1 a downgrade in the rating of a 'bad'…rm i. Let I D i;t+1 be the indicator of the downgrade event which takes a value of 1 when the downgrade arrives, and zero otherwise. In our framework, any market participant or investor other than the …rm's managers and the rating agencies only have access to publicly available information at time t.
De…ne X i;t as the information that is publicly available about …rm i including any publicly observable action taken by the …rm that might a¤ect the downgrade event at time t. After observing the action, the investors can infer the potential consequences of such an action on I D i;t+1 . The downgrade event also depends on the set Z t , which is the information privately available to the …rm and the rating agency at time t.
Let I D (X i;t ; Z i;t ) be the function of a downgrade for …rm i at time t based on the information sets X i;t and Z i;t . Let d t = 1 indicate the rating agency's decision with probability to announce the outcome from the indicator function I D (X i;t ; Z i;t ) at time t+1 rather than at t; else with probability 1 for d t = 0 that the rating agency decides to announce at time t. In other words, the probability of delaying the agency's assessment outcome to the public is . Therefore, when the rating agency decides not to reveal the downgrade information until t + 1; the public observes this downgrade event as I
only until time t + 1; but not at t:
Thus, the downgrade decision from the rating agency observed by the public is:
where I D i;t+1 is the observed downgrade event at t+1 on …rm i, and
is the assessment outcome of the downgrade function for …rm i at time t:
6 Equation (1) shows the equivalence between a delay and the event of no downgrade. Thus the investor has to predict the event without full knowledge of the …rm's a¤airs (Z i;t ), whereas the manager only needs to predict the delay by the rating agency.
For the investor without the knowledge of Z t ; her expectation at time t of a downgrade at time t + 1 in the rating of …rm i is:
6 According to the model, when there is no delay in the rating agency's rating announcement, i.e., = 0 such that with 100% probability d t = 0; then at time t + 1 the indicator I U i;t+1 of the upgrade event takes a value of zero. The observed rating change therefore occurs in the same period as soon as the indicator function gives its assessment outcome.
Similarly, for the manager of …rm i who has the knowledge of X t and Z t ; the expectation of a rating downgrade is:
The information gap between the …rm manager and the investor for a rating downgrade for …rm i is therefore:
An empirical model of an information gap
In order to capture the expectation in rating changes of the 'outsiders'who use public information, we use a logit model to capture the likelihood of a downgrade (as in I 
where SP LT i;t and SP LT i;t+1 are, respectively, the Compustat data items for the S&P domestic long-term issuer credit rating for …rm i at quarters t and t + 1. S&P long term credit rating re ‡ects Standard & Poor's view of the obligor's capacity and willingness to meet its long-term …nancial commitments.
It is important to note that there is a distinct di¤erence between our downgrade indicators and those of Kisgen (2006). Kisgen (2006) In our study, we look at the actual change in ratings from quarter t to t + 1. We consider this a realistic classi…cation of the direction of rating changes for our purposes.
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Thus the downgrade decision from the rating agency is based on decision model:
where X i;t is a vector of observable state variables and …rm actions that captures the changes to capital structure of the …rm, and Z i;t is a vector of unobserved decision variables.
Since only X i;t is observed by the public, the logit model is estimated by the public as:
Speci…cally, we regress the downgrade outcome LT D D i;t+1 on the state variables: Leverage i;t , P rof it i;t , Size i;t , P rice i;t , and Liquidity i;t (see also Ederington and Yawitz, 1986) , controlling for both the industry and quarter …xed e¤ects. 9 It is plausible that when …rms increase their leverage (4det i;t )
or decrease their equity (4eqt i;t ) through share repurchase, the likelihood of a downgrade increases. The changes in capital structure 4det i;t ; 4eqt i;t in equation 3 are publicly observable. Thus, our framework accommodates the ability of outside investors of observing 4det i;t ; 4eqt i;t , and hence being able to predict the possibility of a downgrade in the next period.
Having estimated equation 3, we obtain the forecasted probability (also 9 The use of the market stock price of a …rm is to recognize that i) stock prices may re ‡ect all publicly available information about a …rm, which includes the information about a …rm's actions that, in our context, are the changes in debt and equity, and ii) investors can incorporate the price information into their prediction for a credit rating change in the next period, in addition to all other …nancial variables of a …rm as we included in our logit regression. Essentially, our logit regression allows for possible information such as the price variable for investors to predict a rating change.
Although one might consider other potential candidate variables to allow the incorporation of …rm information such as corporate bond yields or the credit default swap spread. Crucially important, however, the change in debt in our analysis includes changes in longterm debt and current debt of a …rm, which in our sample consists of not only corporate bonds but also other types of debt that are not necessarily publicly traded. Also corporate bonds are typically thinly traded. Thus, the relevant bond yield of a …rm in any period may not be su¢ cient and readily available for analyzing all the sample …rms. Moreover, only a small fraction of …rms have credit default swaps traded in the OTC market, which is typical for these derivatives contracts. Hence, it is not feasible to utilize these candidate variables for the analysis of the information gap model. Given the relatively higher price discovering e¢ ciency of the stock price, we use this variable to capture all possible information publicly available to the market. 
We use the rare events small sample bias correction method of King and Zeng (2001) on our model, as the large majority of …rm-quarters are not associated with downgrades.
Next, we de…ne the gap between the realized rating change at time t + 1 and the outsiders'expectation of a rating change based on public information for a downgrade, respectively, as:
which is a function of the unobserved variables Z i;t (see Cramer, 2005 ).
In our framework, the managers have superior information relative to the public, and the gap de…ned above captures the content of the superior information re ‡ected in Z i;t , which is instrumented by the information gap.
We examine whether this residual private information has value and is related to changes in capital structure. 13
Foreseeable downgrades and firm actions
Consider a …rm that faces negative future prospects the current rating of the …rm may over evaluate its credit quality. A rating downgrade coming late may thus grant opportunities for the …rm to hold back the unfavorable information from the outsiders, and allow a time window for the …rm to conduct …nancing at relatively lower costs than the would-be cost level had the unfavorable information being revealed without delay.
Formally, de…ne the market value of the …rm at time t as:
where E it and D it are, respectively, the market values of equity and debt of …rm i at time t. A rating downgrade will lead to a reduction of the …rm value which will lower the market value of the …rm to A D i;t+1 at time t + 1 :
Hence, the expected market value of the …rm by the manager, having taken into account of the probability of delaying rating changes, is:
The expected market value of …rm i by the uninformed public investor is:
Therefore the di¤erence in the expected market value of the …rm,
from the information gap between the …rm and the public is:
It is clear therefore that if a …rm faces a downgrade, there is overpricing in the current market value of the …rm at time t because of the increased likelihood of a debt default. In other words, before a downgrade a …rm enjoys potential discrete bene…t in …rm value from the presently higher rating, which is consistent with the CR-CS theory (see Figure 1 , Kisgen 2006). To reiterate, our focuses are that managers are concerned about the anticipated future rating changes, and that managers understand the potential discrete bene…t in …rm value.
E¤ectively, the …rm is in a position to explore mispricing by increasing debt or equity at time t. 10 When a …rm faces a downgrade, it's decision is whether to raise equity or debt in order to exploit overpricing. These actions, however, have costs, and therefore, …rms must balance the associated costs and bene…ts of debt and equity to decide the …nancing choice.
We argue that 'bad'…rms will prefer debt to equity since increasing equity will have limited bene…ts, but immediate costs. The choice of increasing equity at time t may cause signi…cant drops in the stock price on the announcement of an equity issuance (Asquith and Mullins 1986) . This is because investors are aware of the problem of information asymmetry, and believe that the …rm's stock is overvalued when the …rm undertakes seasoned equity o¤erings (Fama and French 2005) .
By using debt …nancing before a downgrade, 'bad' …rms face a risk of sending the rating further down the line. On the other hand, 'bad' …rms can take advantage of the relatively cheaper debt before the downgrade is realized. The cost of debt capital re ‡ects the perceived creditworthiness of the …rm, and 'bad'…rms may prefer to get the bene…ts of leverage before the downgrade. Berger, Espinosa-Vega, Frame and Miller (2005) also suggest that …rms with unfavorable private information are willing to pay the costs on long-term debt. From the above analysis we arrive at our hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 : 'Bad' …rms prefer to increase debt before a credit rating downgrade.
Speci…cally, the hypothesis states that: The relation between the change in debt 4det i;t and the information gap, G If the results indicate that 4det i;t is not related to G D i;t+1 , it will be a result of either = 0; which suggests that the …rm does not have insider information, and/or (g 0 = 0), which suggests that the …rm does not take action according to our hypothesis.
Data and sample

Sample construction
We collect quarterly data of …rm …nancial and monthly Standard & Poor (S&P) ratings data from Compustat, covering more than 30,000 active and inactive publicly listed …rms in the U.S. The sample covers all …rms with quarterly …nancial data and at least one rating record during the sample period from Q1 1985, when the ratings data begin, until Q4 2010. We exclude …rm-quarter observations with negative equity, i.e., leverage greater than one.
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We further exclude utility companies (SIC 4900-4999) and …nancial companies (SIC 6000-6999). Myers (2001) points out that these companies have a narrow menu of …nancing choices and cannot adjust their capital structures at relatively low costs. In addition, regulations relating to the disclosure policies of …nancial …rms are usually stricter than those for non-…nancial …rms.
11 See the appendix for details on the variables we use in the analysis.
Summary statistics
We classify a …rm-quarter as a 'downgrade'when the …rm gets downgraded in the next quarter. Panels A and B of Table 1 show, respectively, summary statistics for the no-downgrade sample, which contains 120,884 …rm-quarter observations, and the downgrade sample, which contains 1,376 …rm-quarter observations. 12 The downgraded …rms, compared to …rms whose ratings are not downgraded, have much higher leverage ratios (50.6% versus 23.5%), lower liquidity (7.5% versus 19.2%), lower Growth (Market-to-Book ratio)
(1.09 versus 1.85), and hold more …xed assets (37.8% versus 26.5%). All of these point to deteriorating …nancial conditions of the downgraded …rms.
These results are consistent with the …ndings in the capital structure literature that companies with relatively safe and tangible assets tend to borrow more than companies with risky and intangible assets since intangible assets are more likely to encounter losses under …nancial distress (see, Myers 1984; Frank and Goyal 2003) . The downgraded …rms also have higher average Size (the log of sales), which is consistent with the notion that large companies tend to borrow more than small …rms (see, Myers 2001, and Frank and Goyal 2003) . Interestingly, in terms of …nancing activities, the downgraded …rms, on average, raise more debt (normalized by total assets) than those …rms whose ratings are not downgraded (3.7% versus 0.6%).
12 Applying further restrictions on selecting downgraded …rms such as those who are downgraded more than once or downgraded by more than one notch may result in very sample size, which undermines robust statistical analysis.
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[Insert Table 1 Table 2 reports the results of estimating credit rating downgrades in a logit model. Firms with high leverage levels tend to be more likely to get credit rating downgrades, while pro…table …rms are less likely to be downgraded.
For the …rm action variables, an increase in debt to total assets i.e. 4det i;t ; increases the probability of long-term rating downgrades. On the other hand, an increase in equity to total assets, i.e. 4eqt i;t ; decreases the probability of long-term rating downgrades, albeit statistically insigni…cant.
The quarter-end stock price, which re ‡ects investors'information of the …rm available to the market by the time of …rm capital structure activities.
In utilizing such price information, we allow the ‡exibility that investors are able to gather signal about the …nancial health of the …rm. The result shows an intuitive pattern that higher stock price is associated with a lower probability of a credit rating downgrade.
[Insert Table 2 here] Next, we analyze the information gap between the insiders and outsiders.
The insiders know with certainty about the future rating changes, and hence do not need to estimate the logit model as the outsiders do. Table 3 shows that, for those …rms whose ratings are not downgraded, outsiders who use the logit model are nearly 99% correct in predicting non-occurance of a downgrade. More interestingly, for those …rms whose ratings are actually downgraded, outsiders are only 4.1% correct in predicting downgrades, while nearly 96% will fail to predict downgrades. These results suggest a potentially large information gap.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Modeling of debt and equity changes due to an information gap
To investigate …rm behavior due to the information gap, we run regressions as in equations 7, 8 and 9 of the change in debt, equity and net debt, normalized by total assets, on the information gaps in rating changes and …rm-level control variables. The rating changes take place in quarter t + 1: We test the e¤ects one quarter before (in quarter t) and in the same quarter of rating changes (at time t + 1):
where =(0; 1), = 0 for one quarter before rating changes, and = 1 for the same quarter of rating changes. The coe¢ cients 1 , 1 and 1 capture, respectively, the e¤ects of adjustments in debt, equity and net debt (debt minus equity) to the information gap pertaining to a long-term credit rating downgrade in quarter t + 1. The vector of X i;t+ 1 represents the control variables. We control for both the industry and quarter …xed e¤ects, and also obtain clustered standard errors using the approach of Peterson (2009). 13 We obtain the variables GLT D Our Hypothesis states that 'bad' …rms prefer to take advantage of the overvalued debt before a rating downgrade. Hence, it predicts a signi…cantly positive 1 in equation (7), an insigni…cant in equation (8), and a signi…- (9) when = 0.
We now take a close scrutiny on the use of long-term and short-term …nancing to understand the ways …rms apply when they anticipate rating changes. To this end, we run the following regressions (eqs. 10 and 11) using the dependent variables de…ned in Section 3.: the ratio of the current period short-term debt change to previous period total assets, Sdet i;t , and the ratio of the current period long-term debt change to previous period total assets, Ldet i;t .
where =(0; 1): [Insert Table 4 here]
Estimation results of debt and equity changes
One quarter before rating changes
The coe¢ cient estimates for the control variables in Table 4 are consistent with the …ndings in the literature in both the sign and statistical signi…cance.
The negative coe¢ cient of leverage (-0.0134, t = -11.04) indicates that Leverage in the previous quarter has a signi…cantly negative e¤ect on debt change in the current quarter, i.e., …rms with higher leverage ratios raise less debt.
The negative coe¢ cient of Liquidity (-0.0175, t = -11.96) indicates that …rm with cash and short-term investment opportunities choose to …nance less by debt. Pro…t is negatively related to equity change (-0.154, t = -66.95). These results are consistent with the notion that pro…table …rms have more internal …nancing resources available (Myers, 2001 1980; Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim 1984) , and equity change (-0.0623, t = -3.88).
In terms of the long-term and short-term debt mix, as reported in columns 4 and 5 of Overall, our …ndings suggest that …rms that will be downgraded tend to take advantage of their currently higher credit rating. In line with Berger, Espinosa-Vega, Frame and Miller (2005) , …rms with unfavorable private information are willing to pay the costs on long-term debt.
The same quarter of the rating changes
Because …rms could potentially raise debt one day before an announced downgrade, we also examine the relation between downgrades and capital structure changes in the same quarter. Table 5 reports …rms'…nancing behavior in the same quarter of rating changes, and con…rms our earlier …ndings that 'bad' …rms signi…cantly increase debt. 'Bad'…rms also do not signi…cantly increase equity in the same quarter of the downgrade, which is similar to the insignificant equity increase in the quarter before a downgrade, as reported in Table   24 4. Note though that the capital structure change in Table 5 could also occur right after a downgrade (while still in the same quarter) and issuing equity could be attempts to increase the …rm's creditworthiness (see also Kisgen 2009).
[Insert Table 5 here]
We also …nd that, in the same quarter when the news of a downgrade in the long-term credit rating is announced, the increase of total debt of 'bad' …rms rests on long-term debt increases 3.76% (t = 15.47). Again, this …nding suggests that 'bad'…rms take advantage of the relatively cheaper long-term debt before downgrades.
Investment-grade firms versus speculative-grade firms
We …nd that …rms' actions with respect to the anticipated rating changes di¤er across rating categories. In particular, speculative-grade …rms appear to be more responsive in adjusting debt than investment-grade …rms. Specifically, we estimate equations 7, 8 and 9 for two sub-samples: …rms with S&P investment-grades (BBB and above) and …rms with S&P speculative-grades (below BBB) according to the S&P domestic long-term issuer credit rating at time t + 1 (the quarter when the rating change is announced).
Columns 6 and 7 of Table 4 and 5 show that before a downgrade 'bad' …rms in the speculative-grade spectrum increase debt to utilize the information gap. The e¤ect is weaker for …rms with investment-grade debt ratings.
These …ndings suggest that speculative-grade …rms are keener to take advantage of the information gap than investment-grade …rms, which is in line with changes in credit ratings being more important for speculative-grade …rms, for example because lower ratings reduce the number of bond portfolio managers that are allowed to invest in the bonds (Grinblatt and Titman 2002).
Intuitively, the information gap between the lower-rated …rms and outsiders is greater than that of the higher-rated …rms, as for instance, fewer analysts tend to follow lower-rated …rms (Chung 2000) .
Credit rating upgrades
We further analyze whether …rms take actions with respect to the anticipated rating upgrades. Similar to our analyses in earlier sections, we estimate a logit model for the probability of a credit rating upgrade based on public information as:
We report the results in Table 6 . An increase in equity to total assets, i.e. 4eqt i;t ; (debt to total assets, i.e. 4det i;t ) is associated with higher (lower) probability of long-term rating upgrades, albeit statistically insignificant. Firms with larger size, higher stock price, higher liquidity and higher pro…t tend more likely to get their credit ratings upgraded.
[Insert Table 6 here]
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We then analyze the information gap between the insiders and outsiders as: Table 7 shows that, for those …rms whose ratings are not upgraded (LT Dup = 0), outsiders who use the logit model are more than 99% correct in predicting non-occurance of an upgrade. For those …rms whose ratings are actually upgraded, outsiders are only 1.67% correct in predicting an upgrade, while by more than 98% chance fail to predict an upgrade. There appears a potentially large information gap, as indicated by GLT Dup.
[Insert Table 7 here]
Next, we separately regress the …nancing variables, i.e., the change in debt, the change in equity, and the change in net debt, on the information gap of a long-term credit rating upgrade GLT D U i;t+1 , similar to eqs 7, 8 and 9. Panels A and B of Table 8 report, respectively, the estimation results for one quarter before and the same quarter of the long-term credit rating upgrade. In all columns of Table 8 , the coe¢ cient of GLT Dup is statistically insigni…cant, suggesting that …rms do not take signi…cant …nancing actions in the light of an upcoming rating upgrade. Intuitively, a good news on the creditworthiness of a …rm to arrives in the near future will drive down its future costs of equity and debt capital. Firm therefore give priority to securing the anticipated rating upgrade. Thus, it is not a surprise to …nd that the information gap does not appear to show any signi…cant e¤ect on the three …nancing variables.
[Insert Table 8 here]
Conclusions
We investigate the impact of information asymmetry between …rms and investors, created by the delay in the arrival of credit rating changes, upon …rms' …nancing changes. Relative to public investors, …rm managers and rating agencies possess more precise and up-to-date knowledge and predictions on the …rm's next-period ratings. This paper asks whether the superior information of the …rms allows them to adjust their …nancing activities before the news of rating changes is publicly disseminated.
We construct a measure of the information gap between …rms and investors concerning credit rating downgrades in the next quarter. We present a model in which outsiders predict …rm rating changes based on the …rm's actions and all other publicly available information. Our framework therefore explicitly accommodates the ability of outsiders to infer the change in the …rm ratings by observing the …rm's actions on capital structure changes. The information gap is thus de…ned as the di¤erence between the actual and the forecasted rating changes. We then model the relation between the …rm's …-nancing adjustments before a downgrade and our measure of the information gap, controlling for a set of conventional …rm variables.
Our results indicate that …rms take advantage of the information asym-28 metry and change their …nancing accordingly. We …nd that …rms raise extra debt in the quarter before a downgrade on the long-term credit rating, consistent with our hypothesis that …rms take advantage of the relatively cheaper debt before downgrades. Moreover, the downgraded …rms do not decrease equity before downgrades, which is evidence against a reversed causality argument. Further, we conduct tests to analyze whether the information gap of an anticipated credit rating upgrade exhibits certain association with the …nancing actions of a …rm. Our evidence indicates that …rms do not take signi…cant actions in equity, debt or net debt, either one quarter before or in the same quarter of a credit rating upgrade. This is consistent with the notion that future costs of capital will be lower when the credit rating of a …rm will become higher in the near future.
The evidence suggests that the information gap on credit ratings between …rms and the market exists, and also that …rms take advantage of the information gap by changing their capital structures. Our …ndings have important implications for policy makers in that tightening the requirements for credit rating agencies to provide timely updates on their rating outputs will reduce asymmetric information and will be bene…cial for public investors and other stakeholders.
Appendix:
Firm action variables
In our analysis we examine the e¤ects on changes in debt, equity and net debt for …rm i in quarter t de…ned as follows:
: debt change, where D i;t is long-term debt increase (Compustat DLTISY) 14 minus long-term debt reduction (Compustat DL-TRY) plus the change in current debt (Compustat DLCCHY) for …rm i in quarter t, and A i;t 1 is total asset (Compustat ATQ) of …rm i in quarter t 1.
: equity change, where E i;t is the sale of common and preferred stock (Compustat SSTKY) minus purchases of common and preferred stock (Compustat PRSTKCY) for …rm i in quarter t.
We also analyze net debt change (as in Kisgen (2006)) as the di¤erence between det i;t and eqt i;t , de…ned as net i;t = D i;t E i;t A i;t 1 . We further look into details of debt changes by examining the e¤ects on short term and long-term debt, respectively.
, where 4SD i;t is the change in current debt (Compustat DLCCHY) for …rm i in quarter t.
, where 4LD i;t is the long-term debt increase (Compustat DLTISY) minus long-term debt reduction (Compustat DLTRY) for …rm i in quarter t.
State variables
We include the control variables (X i;t ) which are conventionally considered in capital structure studies including: Leverage, Size, Price, Liquidity, Pro…t, Earnings, Growth, Tangibility and Non-Debt Tax Shields (NDTS) to sep-arate their in ‡uences from the role of information gap on …rms' …nancing activities.
15
Leverage i;t : the ratio of the sum of short-term debt (Sdet) (Compustat DLCQ) and long-term debt (Ldet) (Compustat DLTTQ) to the sum of shortterm debt, long-term debt and stockholders'equity (Compust LSEQ minus LTQ) for …rm i in quarter t.
Size i;t : the logarithm of sales (Compustat SALEQ) for …rm i in quarter t.
P rice i;t : the logarithm of the stock's quarterly closing price in the quarter (Compustat PRCCQ) for …rm i in quarter t. Liquidity i;t : the ratio of cash and cash equivalent (Compustat CHEQ) to total assets (Compustat ATQ) for …rm i in quarter t.
P rof it i;t : the ratio of EBITDA to total assets (Compustat ATQ) for …rm i in quarter t.
16
Earnings i;t : the ratio of retained earnings (Compustat REQ) to total assets (Compustat ATQ) for …rm i in quarter t. Growth i;t : the ratio of total book value of debt plus quarterly close price (Compustat PRCCQ) times the number of common stock shares outstanding (Compustat CSHOQ) to total asset (Compustat ATQ) for …rm i in quarter t.
15 Kisgen (2006) shows signi…cant negative relations between leverage and debt …nancing. Titman and Wessels (1988) show that …rm size, as indicated by the logarithm of sales, is one of the crucial determinants of capital structure. Marsh (1982) shows that changes in security prices alter debt/equity ratios. Myers (2001) and Fama and French (2002) demonstrate that pro…t is an important factor that a¤ects capital structure. Market-tobook ratio (de…ned as growth in our study) and tangibility are variables a¤ecting leverage ratio in Rajan and Zingales (1995) . Dividends and earnings policies relate tightly to the increase of debt and equity sale (Titman and Wessels, 1988) . We include liquidity (see Kim, Mauer and Sherman, 1998) to control for possible impacts on leverage from …rms' cash positions and non-debt tax shields (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980, and Bradley, Jarrell and Kim, 1984) . 16 EBIT DA i;t is the earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization for …rm i at time t, which is calculated as the sum of pretax income (Compustat PIQ), interest expense (Compustat TIEQ) and depreciation and amortization (Compustat DPQ).
T angibility i;t : the ratio of (net) property plant and equipment (Compustat PPENTQ) to total asset (Compustat ATQ) for …rm i in quarter t.
N DT S i;t : the ratio of deferred taxes and investment tax credit (Compustat TXDITCQ) to total assets (Compustat ATQ) for …rm i in quarter t.
Forecasting rating changes
We estimate a logit model by regressing two distinct categories: downgrades and 'others'(no rating change or upgrades) of S&P Long Term Rating ('others'is the reference category) on independent variables as re-written below:
LT D is the response variable that indicates the rating change choice made by the rating agency. The state variables are conventionally considered in capital structure studies including: Leverage, Size, Price, Liquidity, Pro…t, Earnings, Growth, Tangibility and non-debt tax shields (NDTS) (see also, Ederington and Yawitz, 1986) , including …rm action variables: 4det i;t and 4eqt i;t .
The predicted rating downgrade probability [ LT D D i;t+1 for …rm i in quarter t + 1 is given by:
The standard interpretation of the logit model is that for a one unit change in the predictor variables, the outcome relative to the reference group is expected to change by its respective parameter estimation given that other 36 variables in the model are unchanged.
The estimation of (14) shows that the probability of downgrade
is decreasing with pro…tability. The p-values from goodness of …t test shows that the model is a good …t for the data overall. For long-term credit ratings, 1.17% of the observations are downgrades. Thus, downgrades are rare events, and the predictors could su¤er from small sample bias. Therefore we use the King and Zeng (2001) rare events small sample correction method for a binomial logistic model. This improves the predictability of the probabilities.
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Figure 1
The information transmission mechanism for Standard and Poor's from their website (https://www.spratings.com/about/about-credit-ratings/ratings-process.html). Table 2 Logit estimates of changes in the long-term debt rating (LTD) in the next quarter This Table 3 Descriptive statistics of the information gap estimate (GLTDdown)
The table lists summary statistics of the probability of a firm being downgraded, i.e., Prob(LTDdown = 1), the probability of not being downgraded, i.e. Prob(LTDdown = 0), and the information gap GLTDdown = LTDdownProb(LTDdown = 1). The probabilities are obtained from estimating the logit model (in Table 2 ). Table 4 Impact of information gap on financing one quarter before the rating downgrade This Table shows the coefficient estimates (and t-statistics) from estimating equations (7), (8), (9), (10) and (11) for the changes in debt, equity and net debt (debt minus equity), respectively, for all the sample firms one quarter before a downgrade in the long-term credit rating. The results from estimating equation (7) for the change in debt for investment and speculative grade firms are also presented. The estimates of firm and quarter fixed effects are not displayed for brevity.
Previous
Changes Table 6 Logit estimates of changes in the long-term debt rating (LTD) in the next quarter This Table 7 Descriptive statistics of the information gap estimate (GLTDup)
The table lists summary statistics of the probability of a firm being upgraded in the long-term credit rating, i.e., Prob(LTDup = 1), the probability of not being upgraded i.e. Prob(LTDup = 0), and the information gap GLTDup = LTDup -Prob(LTDup = 1). The probabilities are obtained from estimating the logit model (in Table 6 ). 
